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The JOURNAL takes great pleasure in announcing the appoint-
ment to the Editorial Board of the following men from the Class
of i9io L.: Howard Francis Bishop, 'o7 Yale, Chicago, Ill.;
William Ernest Collins, 'o7 Yale, Livingston, N. J.; Clarence
Russell Hall, 'o7 Yale, Woodstock, Conn.; Charles Edwin
Hart, Jr., 'o7 Yale, New Britain, Conn.; Charles Kenneth
Wynne, New Haven, Conn.
The American Bar Association at its meeting in Seattle in
August took advanced position on some important matters relat-
ing to legal education and admissions to the bar. In the report
which Dean Rogers submitted as Chairman of the Association's
Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
at the meeting at Portland, Maine, in I9O7, a number
of important recommendations were made. The report
was not acted upon in i9o7 as it had not been printed in full
prior to the meeting. It was, therefore, laid over to be con-
sidered at the Seattle meeting this year. It accordingly came up
for final considerition at Seattle in August last and the recom-
mendations were adopted with the exception of that relating
to a uniform law on the subject of law degrees. That particular
recommendation Dean Rogers declined to call up this year inas-
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much as the minority member of the Committee who had dis-
sented on that particular recommendation, was unable to be
present at the meeting.
Among the recommendations thus adopted, attention is called
to the following:
That a candidate for admission to the Bar should have an
education equivalent at least to that required for graduation from
a high school within the state in which the application is made;
that the Association is not to be understood as holding the opinion
that a high school education is fully adequate to the needs of
those who are to practice law, but on the contrary, entertains the
opinion that the interests of the profession and of the state will be
promoted if all candidates for admission are required to have an
education equivalent at least to two years of a college course;
that the Association approves a rule requiring candidates for
admission to the Bar to study law for three years if graduates
of law schools, and for four years if not; that the Association
approves a four years' course in case of night law schools; that
the Association disproves conferring a law degree by correspond-
ence schools.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION.
Growth is the test of vitality in every living organism and that
there should be a gradual development of the principles of law
and the powers of the courts is undeniable, but in the case of
Samuel W. Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works,
decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, July 27,
19o8, where the decision was rendered on the authority of pre-
vious rulings, we have what seems to be a rather wide extension
of the law of development and even a misinterpretation of the
cases cited to substantiate the decision.
The complainant, S. W. Rushmore, secured an injunction
against the Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works on the
grounds of unfair competition in the production and sale of an
automobile lamp. He had widely advertised a lamp "Flare Front,"
insisting particularly upon the advantages of its peculiar shell-
shaped construction. The defendant's lamp "Phoebus" having
practically the same design, it was the complainant's charge that
the defendant was profiting by his advertising and pawning off
on the public its lamp as the "Flare Front." The design of the
"Flare Front" was not patented by the complainant; the word
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"Phoebus," together with the name of its manufacturer, was legibly
and clearly stamped upon the lamp of the defendant; and suffi-
cient proof was not advanced to establish that the defendant had
ever represented its lamp as that of the complainant. Never-
theless an injunction was granted against the manufacture or sale
of defendant's lamp. The judge of the Circuit Court, whose
opinion is sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, gives the
following reason for issuing the injunction: "Assuming that at
the present time the defendant is not using the word
'flare-front,' is not selling its product as Rushmore lamps,
and is not using in any way either of these words or phrases, the
question is whether plaintiff is entitled to be protected from un-
necessary imitation of non-functional parts of his well-known
lamp. It seems to me that under the cases of Enterprise Manu-
facturing Co. v. Landers, 131 Fed. 24o, and Marvel Co. v. Pearl,
133 Fed. i6o, he is so entitled." A close examination of the
authorities cited discloses in the present case a very remarkable
development of the doctrine of unfair trade. The following ex-
tract from the opinion of the court in Enterprise Manufacturing
Co. v. Landers, supra, shows the wrong done complainant to be
much more aggravated than in the present case. "Here on the con-
trary, they have not only conformed their goods to complainants'
in size and general shape, which was to be expected, but also in
all minor details of structure-every line and curve being re-
produced, and superfluous metal put into the driving wheels to
produce a strikingly characteristic effect, while the goods are
so dressed with decorations reproduced or closely simulated, with
style of lettering and details of ornamentation, that except for
the fact that on the one mill is found the complainant's name and
on the other the defendants', it would be very difficult to tell them
apart. Defendants admitted using parts of mills sold by com-
plainants as patterns wherever it was convenient or profitable to
do so." Evidently there is in question here a far closer imitation
than was found to exist in the case of the "Phoebus."
In the case of Marvel Co. v. Pearl, supra, the injunction asked
for was denied, the court saying: "In the absence of protection
by patent, no person can monopolize or appropriate to the ex-
clusion of others elements of mechanical construction which are
essential to the successful practical operation of a manufacture,
or which primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the purpose
to which it is devotel. Unfair competition is not established by
proof of similarity in form, dimensions or general appearance
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alone." It does not seem to be questioned that the flaring front
design has, in an automobile lamp, decided utility and this is the
feature of the "Phoebus" to which censure is primarily attached.
Thus the cases cited apparently are not authority for the present
ruling.
Independent of these two cases from which an argument in
favor of an injunction can be drawn only with difficulty others
may be cited which hold positively against the ruling; as for
example in the case of Brown v. Seidel, 153 Pa. St. 6o, the court
said: "It is only where there is a manifest intent on the part of
one manufacturer to sell his goods as and for the goods of another
manufacturer that the aid of equity has been successfully in-
voked." No such intention was proven on the part of the Man-
hattan Screw and Stamping Works. While in order to prove
fradulent intent it is not necessary to show that any purchaser
was in fact misled, Von Mumm v. Frash, 56 Fed. 830, still the
absence of evidence to show that any one has been deceived is a
circumstance tending to show that no one is likely to be deceived,
Heinz v. Lutz, 146 Pa. St. 592. This is especially true where the
article is expensive.
Automobile lamps are as a rule sold among persons of more
than ordinary intelligence and being an expensive article we
might naturally expect that care would be used in their selection.
The fact that these circumstances must be considered, is clearly
demonstrated by the case of Fischer v. Blank, 138 N. Y. 244, in
which the court said: "The true test, we think, is whether the
resemblance is such that it is calculated to deceive, and does in
fact, deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the
ordinary conditions which prevail in the conduct of the particular
traffic to which the controversy relates."
THE EFFECT OF NONUSE ON A PATENTEE'S REMEDY AGAINST
INFRINGEMENT.
Our liberal theory as to patent right is in harmonious accord
with the broad spirit of our constitutions and our courts en-
couraging private enterprise in general. Commerce, manufac-
ture and production have been left as free as possible from govern-
mental surveillance. For in a new country, the chief ambition is
growth and the strongest incentive to advance is private property.
Not only should the volume of business be improved, but also
the methods of operation should constantly be changed for the
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better by the adoption of new ingenious devices. To foster inven-
tion and discovery to the very limit of the law was the far-sighted
aim of the framers of the Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8, which
reads: "The Congress shall have power to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." So explicit a grant to patentees could not well be
construed, observing the recognized rule that constitutional pro-
visions are to be read according to their obvious intendment, as
giving, during the time prescribed, a narrower right than that
which inheres in the absolute owners of property in general.
That this right is not lost by a failure to use a patent is affirmed in
the recent case of Continental Paper Bag Co. v. '.astern Paper
Bag Co., 28 Sup. Ct., Rep. 748.
Upon this idea of property right, the early decisions and the
best modern opinions stand strong. The Supreme Court de-
clared in 1846: "The law has enabled the patentee to hold and
deal with his patent the same as in the case of any other descrip-
tion of property belonging to him, and on his death it passes,
with the rest of his personal estate to his legal representatives
and becomes part of the assets." Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How.
646. See also Jordan v. Overseers, 4 0. 295. Since he is in
no sense indebted for this right to the law; Jordan v. Overseers,
supra; he consequently may deal with it as he sees fit during his
period of monopoly and'also afterwards, the sole difference being
that in- the one case he is protected by the law. In return for this
he incurs one single contractual obligation, which is to describe
and deliver his secret to the public at the expiration of his period
of monopoly. Showing that the public has no right to the benefit of
any patent right until then, the United States Supreme Court said
in 1896: "That the grant is made upon the reasonable expectation
that he will either put his invention to practical use or permit
others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms is doubtless
true. This expectation is based alone on the supposition that the
patentee's interest will induce him to use, or let others use his
invention. The public has received no other security to enforce
such expectation. A suppression can endure but for the life of
the patent and thr disclosure he has made will enable all to enjoy
the fruits of his genius." Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co.
v. Eureka Specialty Co., 47 U. S. App. 146.
However clear it may be that this interest of the public is
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utterly abstract and without legal significance, considerable error
has arisen by imposing on the patentee a legal duty to use his
patent, thus making him a quasi-trustee for the public. The in-
fluence of this view has been subtle. Peculiar cases have been
presented, where the patentee has closeted his patented device,
another person of enterprise has applied it to vastly cheapening
and improving a certain production with great service to the
public so that the contrast has elicited favorable consideration for
one who is actually an unmistakable infringer. So strong is
public opinion in demanding, above all, public service that the
courts frown upon a non-user and uphold one apparently more
enterprising who has violated an express law. Thus the court in
Sullivan v. Redfield, Fed. Cas., No. 13,597, intimated that a cer-
tain rule "applies with peculiar force to a case where a patentee
has slept upon a naked patent right for a great length of time
without carrying it into effect." The same reasoning was used
in the decision of a case where a prior patented, but unused in-
vention had been interfered with by a subsequent patent on an
exactly similar machine: "The Stonemetz press, though covered
by a patent, seems to me a mere disembodied idea, which, what-
ever its merit, is not here entitled to equitable aid, nor within the
spirit of the patent system, which requires diligence in giving to
the public the benefit of his invention." Campbell Printing Press
& Mfg. Co. v. Duplex Printing Press Co., 86 Fed. 331. The most
conspicuous case and one in which the fact of non-use constituted
the main ground for denying remedy against infringement is Hoe
v. Knap, 27 Fed. 204: "The question therefore arises whether a
court will grant an injunction in favor of an owner of a patent
who has not after a reasonable time put it into use, against an-
other who is using it. I think, under a patent which gives a
patentee a monopoly, he is bound either to use the patent himself
or allow another to use it on reasonable or equitable terms."
None higher than a Circuit Court has ever taken this view.
The best jurisdictions have insisted on clinging to the elementary,
constitutional idea of absolute right in a patentee. For example:
"A man may obtain a patent for an invention and let it lie in the
Patent Office without use, and no one else would have the right
to use such invention: because it is his property." Pitts v.
Wemple, 2 Fischer, io. The reasoning in Hoe v. Knap, supra,
was directly attacked in Button Fastener Co. v: Specialty Co.,
supra. See also: Mount Morris Electric Light Co. v. Edison
Electric Light Co., 20 U. S. App. i i i.
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The patentee should merit the benefit of the doubt in case of
failure to use his invention, for there are many conceivable ways
of explaining such conduct. Possibly he is waiting to perfect
an improvement; may be occupied with another patent of more
importance; or he may be without funds.
Whatever the particular circumstances may be, it is the duty
of a court to apply clearly expressed rules. The unusual right
of the patentee to protection is emphasized by his exceptional
position under various acts. In selling his patent he is free from
the restrictions of the Sherman Anti-Trust law and therefore may
annex the most monopolistic conditions to his sale. Victor Talk-
ing Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424. Not even misuse .of
his patent in some way negatives the presumption that he will
serve the public, for he is allowed wide freedom. Fuller v.
Berger, 12o Fed. 274. Certainly nonuse ought not ever to in-
duce a court to act in contravention of so marked a policy.
THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IN WILL CASES.
The case of Lockwood v. Lockwood, decided by the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut, in March, i9o8 (8o Conn. 513,
69 Atlantic 8), contains an unusually lucid exposition of the law
as to the burden of proof in will cases and the nature of the
presumption of undue influence, and a sound and convincing
limitation of that presumption.
The rule of the burden of proof in contests as to the probate
of a will is complicated, first, by the especial importance given to
the subscribing witnesses by the law of wills, secondly, by the
normal presumption of sanity, and thirdly, by exceptional
presumption of undue influence.
The issues in the ordinary will contest are three: did the testator
execute the will in the manner required by law, was he of sound
and disposing mind and memory, was he induced to make the will
by any fraud, duress or undue influence?
It is evident that, as to the first two of these issues, the burden
of proof is upon the proponent of the will; the will cannot be
probated until it has been shown to the court that the testator was
competent to make a will, and that he did make it in the legal
manner. But, the presumption that every man is sane until proof
is given to the contrary would relieve the proponent of the neces-
sity of opening the question of mental competency (as the State
is relieved of proving the prisoner's sanity in a criminal prosecu-
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tion), were it not for the peculiar importance given to the testi-
mony of the subscribing witnesses, who must be called by the
proponent, and whose testimony must support the will. If they
testify satisfactorily to the execution of the will, and to the testa-
tor's competency, the will is supported by the evidence peculiarly
relied upon by the law in will matters, and the proponent of the
will may rest upon his prima facie case. And this required testi-
mony must show the testator's mental competency, as well as his
actual execution of the alleged will.
If the subscribing witnesses should deny, or should refuse to
affirm, either the due execution of the will, or the testator's sound-
ness of mind, the proponent would have failed to make out the
technical prima facie case recognized by law, or he would have
overthrown the presumption of sanity by the doubt cast upon it
by his own witnesses, and it would therefore be necessary for him
to support his case, discredited by the hostile evidence of the
witnesses especially relied upon by the law, by the testimony of
other satisfactory witnesses, before he could safely rest his case.
Even if he has, by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses,
made out the legal prima facie case, he has shifted to his adversary
only the duty of going forward with other testimony; the burden
of proof, in its proper sense, still rests upon the proponent of the
will as to due execution and mental competency, and at the con-
clusion of the trial, the court or jury, to sustain the will, must find
that a fair preponderance of the evidence is in favor of the will
upon those points.
Crowninshield v. Crowinshield, 2 Gray 524, Thayer's Cases on
Evidence, ioo.
As to the issue of undue influence, the burden of proof is upon
the opponents of the will; the allegation of undue influence is
regarded as one in confession and avoidance, and it is no more
necessary for the proponent of the will to offer affirmative evi-
dence of the freedom of the testator from such influence than it
would be for one who sought to prove a deed to add to the proof
of execution affirmative proof of the absence of fraud or duress.
But here comes in a presumption peculiar to the law of wills,
thus stated in the Lockwood case. "In certain cases: where the
natural object of the testator's bounty is excluded from partici-
pation in his estate, where a stranger supplants children, and the
will is in favor of the lawyer drawing and advising as to its pro-
visions, or the guardian having charge of his person and estate,
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or of the person occupying a clearly analogous position of trust,
there is imposed upon the proponents of the will the obligation
of disproving by a clear preponderance of evidence the actual
exercise of undue irifluence by such beneficiaries of the will."
Such facts, therefore, appearing on the face of the will itself, or
disclosed by the evidence of the subscribing witnesses, create a
presumption of undue influence which the proponents of the will
must remove before they can claim to have made a prima facie
case.
The leading case as to this presumption is Barry v. Butlin, 2
Moore P. C., 48o, Thayer's Cases, 82; and it has often been fol-
lowed and applied in the American courts.
In the Lockwood case, it appeared that the testatrix was the
mother of nine adult children, and that she gave to two of these
much more than to the others; it also appeared that one of the
favored daughters had been accustomed to attend to business
matters for her mother, and to advise her, and that she went
with her to the lawyer's office where the will was drawn. Other
evidences was given to support and to overthrow the claim of undue
influence. The trial judge was asked to charge the jury, and did
charge them, that the above facts raised a presumption of undue
influence, and that the burden was upon the proponents of the
will to remove it by a preponderance of the evidence.
This the Supreme Court held to be erroneous, saying: "There
is a broad distinction btween the effect of a confidential relation
of a legatee to the testator, as suggestive of undue influence, when
that legatee is a stranger and when he is a child. In the latter
case, both the relation of confidence and some participation in the
estate is natural. In Dale's Appeal, 57 Conn. 127, we say: 'It
is the duty of a son to entitle himself to the confidence of his
parents; it is his right to ask with earnestness, restrained within
proper limits, for testamentary remembrance.' The language used
in that case is applicable to the facts appearing in this."
The ruling in this case seems to be eminently sound. The jury
are entitled in every case to have all the facts put before them as
to the relations between the testator and the beneficiaries of the
will; any evidence of undue influence, any abuse of confidence,
they should give its full weight. But the spirit of the modem
law of evidence does not favor and ought not to favor creating
artificial rules as to the force of evidence, or confusing the minds
of jurymen by instructing them to determine the preponderance
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
of the evidence in any other way than by the exercise of their best
reason on all the facts of the case.
If a person of sound mind, in the presence of three witnesses,
has executed according to law a will of his property, it ought not
to be set aside by a jury unless all the facts have created a pre-
ponderant belief in their minds that the will was induced by
fraud or undue influence; and any rule of law by which their
judgment is to be controlled by a presumption defined by the court
ought to be limited to cases clearly of a suspicious and reprehen-
sible character.
E.P.
THE USE OF THE QUO WARRANTO.
The ordinary use of the information in the nature of quo
warranto or its statutory substitute, for many of the states have
statutes defining it, lies where a person has usurped an office, or
franchise, or where once having held such office or franchise he
has forfeited it by misuser or nonuser. Leigh v. State, 69 Ala.,
261. This use of the writ is in every respect a survival of the
common law functions which it performed.
In the month of July, 19o8, the Supreme Court of Florida
handed down an opinion in the suit of the State of Florida ex rel,
W. H. Ellis, Attorney General, v. Gustav Gerbing, which is of
very general interest, as involving the right of the public to take
oysters in or on the shores of navigable waters below high water
mark. Stated briefly it was a quo warranto proceeding in the
Circuit Court by the Attorney General to ascertain by what war-
rant or authority the defendant had marked and staked off cer-
tain portions of the bed of a navigable river in a certain county
in Florida, and claimed and usurped the exclusive right to the
use, benefit and enjoyment of, natural or maternal oyster beds
upon the designated land below high water mark and extending
to the channel of said navigable river.
We venture to say that the use of quo warranto to try such
a right is a peculiar if not doubtful procedure in this particular
case. And it is more remarkable, upon consideration, that the
court failed to challenge its use in this specific instance, and did
not even allude to the point throughout its opinion.
We have learned that quo warranto lies to try the right to a
franchise. In this case we believe it material to know the con-
struction placed by courts upon the word "franchise." A very
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clear idea of its meaning may be obtained from the words of
Chief Justice Taney, in the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13
Pet. (U. S.) 595, where he said: "For franchises are special privi-
leges conferred by government upon individuals, and which do not
belong to the citizens of the country, generally, of common right.
It is essential to the character of a franchise that it should be a
grant from the sovereign authority, and in this country no fran-
chise can be held which is not derived from a law of the state."
In T. & T. T. Road Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89, the court said:
"It is a sovereign prerogative, and vests in an individual only by
virtue of a legislative grant." So general is this conception of a
franchise that it is needless to multiply citations.
We arrive now at what is the decisive question and upon which
the propriety of the use of a quo warranto rests. Was the right
questioned by the Attorney General a "franchise" within the
definition given it by the courts? We think not. There was a
statute in the state to which it might be well to refer. In order
to develop resources and encourage industries, limited privileges
are granted to individuals to plant oysters in the public waters
of the state. The statute provides that such rights shall
not obstruct or interfere with the navigation of any of
the navigable waters of the state, and also provides
that all the existing natural or maternal beds in the
waters of the state are exempt from the provisions of the act,
and that such natural or maternal oyster beds shall remain for
the free use of the citizens of this state. Gen. Stats. of Florida,
646 to 65i. The court has not lost sight of this statute for it
refers to it by saying: "But this statute . . . . expressly
provides that natural or maternal oyster beds in the waters of the
state shall remain for the use of the citizens of the state."
Here is a right open to all the citizens and not the subject of
legislative grant. It is difficult to reconcile the attitude of the
court toward the statute itself where the free use of the beds is
expressly reserved to the citizens, and its failure to comment upon
the method of proceeding-a procedure which tries the right to
franchises. According to the construction placed upon the word
"franchise," it is plain, that what is free to the people in general
and not the subject of legislative grant, is not a franchise. If it
were such, it would mean that no citizen had this right without
grant, and the purpose of the statute reserving the free use to
the people, would be defeated.
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Even eliminating the statute, it is not easy to see that a fran-
chise was involved. The defendant claimed the exclusive right to
lands held in trust for the people by the state, so the court found.
These lands could not be entirely alienated, but the state could
grant limited privileges to him without at the same time giving
him a franchise. As fishing rights are in the public, unless re-
stricted by statute, the grant of a privilege to the defendant would
not have been clothed with the attributes of a franchise. Even if
the grant to him were exclusive, it would not be a franchise, for
the right could be exercised "without the express permission of
the sovereign power" and a franchise in its true sense is lacking.
It seems apparent then, that error was committed in permitting
such an action for accomplishing the end desired. Other methods
might have been employed and when that is true, the law says that
quo warranto will not lie, for it is an extraordinary legal remedy,
and where there is other plain and adequate remedy, that remedy
must be used. Tarbox v. Sughrue, 36 Kan. 228.
The facts of the case show that the defendant was exceeding
any legal rights he may have had, and it follows that another
remedy must be found. Inasmuch as the necessary franchise was
wanting, which would warrant the procedure adopted by the
Attorney General, we believe the end could have been reached
properly, by an action of trespass, a criminal information, or by
an injunction from a court of equity.
